Abstract
The invasion of Ukraine has exposed significant challenges in NATO’s strategic framework, particularly in Europe. The conflict has evolved into a protracted struggle characterised by the depletion of munitions and the emergence of advanced unmanned systems. While the United States supports Ukraine with air defence systems, it faces its own resource constraints, exacerbated by demands in the Middle East. Concurrently, Russia’s use of Iranian drone technology and domestic production of UAVs has bolstered its operational capabilities, prompting Ukraine to counter with innovative unmanned solutions. This underscores the need for NATO to integrate UAVs and UUVs into coastal and seabed defence strategies.
Beyond Ukraine, maritime security concerns in the Middle East and South China Sea illustrate the strategic importance of unmanned systems. Iran’s use of explosive USVs and China’s deployment of advanced autonomous platforms highlight the rising prominence of such technologies in "Grey Zone" operations. Meanwhile, Europe faces dual challenges: countering Russian reconnaissance of critical undersea infrastructure and addressing its own procurement inefficiencies. Unmanned systems offer a cost-effective solution to bridge capability gaps, enhance situational awareness, and pre-position assets in potential conflict zones.
The future of naval warfare will increasingly rely on artificial intelligence and autonomous platforms, requiring ethical oversight and robust cybersecurity measures to mitigate risks such as "Tech Piracy." To remain effective, NATO must prioritise the rapid integration of unmanned systems, leveraging small and medium enterprises to overcome traditional bureaucratic hurdles. A proactive and adaptive approach to these emerging technologies is essential to ensuring maritime security in an evolving geopolitical landscape.
Introduction
This paper examines the evolving geopolitical challenges in maritime defence and security that the West currently faces and is likely to confront in the near future. It explores potential technical solutions, focusing on the role of advanced maritime autonomy and Artificial Intelligence in countering these threats. The analysis includes an assessment of how adversaries are leveraging autonomous technologies to gain strategic advantages and highlights the United States' leadership in developing and implementing autonomous strategies. Additionally, the paper addresses the critical steps Europe must take to advance its own strategies for autonomous and unmanned platforms to effectively counter these growing threats and close existing capability gaps.
Ukraine
Since the invasion of Ukraine, NATO's overall strategy particularly in Europe has faced serious challenges. The conflict has evolved into a drawn-out struggle centred on supply and demand characterized by persistent artillery exchanges and the rapid depletion of weapons systems. European nations have struggled to sustain essential munitions supplies such as artillery shells, while the United States has made considerable efforts to provide air defence systems to counter Russian missile attacks. However, the US is also experiencing magazine debt with the Pentagon withholding off-the-shelf weapons promised to maintain their own operational stock levels. The burden of US Navy supporting two carrier groups in the Middle East is also adding to the strain of force projection.
Russia’s adoption of Iranian drone technology, such as the Shahed 136, has enabled effective saturation of Ukrainian air defences using swarm tactics. Domestic production of these drones in Tatarstan has further bolstered Russia’s strategic edge. In response, Ukraine has ramped up its own defence manufacturing, with small and medium enterprises (SMEs) producing UAVs and USVs that have been extremely effective against the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine's success in rapidly deploying these systems highlights a stark contrast with the slow and cumbersome procurement processes typical of UK and European governments.
Sub-Sea Warfare
NATO must draw lessons from Ukraine, especially concerning the strategic use of unmanned systems to defend European coastal areas. Russia's ongoing efforts to map subsurface infrastructure in Europe, under the guise of scientific research, pose a real threat to key assets like fibre optic cables and energy pipelines. This reconnaissance activity has the potential to support future hostile actions aimed at crippling infrastructure, as outlined in, From Space to Seabed, by Hendriks and Halem (2024). The report emphasizes that undersea cables are vital to the global economy, and countries like China are already leveraging advanced sensors and unmanned vessels to protect their networks.
Addressing these vulnerabilities requires integrating unmanned systems into seabed defence. Equipped with submarine detection and multibeam sonar, these systems can relay real-time data for intelligence assessment and prompt naval intervention. The UK Ministry of Defence's Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance (MROS) program should be accelerated to incorporate USVs and UUVs into a comprehensive defence strategy, leveraging advanced technology from SMEs to outpace government development timelines.
Another pressing issue is the need to build infrastructure capable of supporting and managing these unmanned systems, particularly in Europe. Much attention has been given to the use of unmanned platforms for tasks like mine detection and neutralisation, which is highly relevant in contested waters like the Black Sea. However, in European waters, the impact of sea mines on commercial shipping is generally an economic and environmental concern rather than a direct threat to national security. By contrast, the potential for adversaries, such as Russia, to sever critical infrastructure like transatlantic data cables poses a far graver risk. The economic fallout from such an act could exceed $1.9 trillion, underscoring the need for a robust and adaptive approach to maritime security that prioritises technological readiness.
The Arctic & Baltic Seas
Over the past decade, the Arctic region has witnessed a significant buildup of Russian military forces, including the establishment of radar stations and air defence sites across the Russian-controlled Arctic sector. The Northern Fleet, operating from the Kola Peninsula, boasts capabilities that not only defend Arctic territory but also project power to the strategic GIUK-N (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom-Norway) Gap. This enables Russia to disrupt NATO's vital sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. Central to Russia's Arctic strategy is the return to Cold War-era bastion defence tactics, securing strategic territory to ensure operational freedom. Russia has expanded this strategy, aiming for deep-water control between Svalbard and Norway and extending its influence toward the GIUK-N Gap. A notable incident in 2022 highlighted this strategy when the undersea satellite cable linking Svalbard to mainland Norway was damaged, an act widely suspected to be Russian sabotage despite Moscow's denial.
Compounding the Arctic's strategic complexity, Russian and Chinese cooperation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has intensified. China has invested over $90 billion in infrastructure along the NSR, securing safe navigation for its vessels and declaring itself a "Near-Arctic" state. In April 2023, Russia and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Russia’s FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard. This agreement mandates the deployment of respective personnel aboard vessels transiting the NSR. Additionally, a new container service from China to St. Petersburg via the NSR was launched in 2023 by China’s Newnew Shipping Company, operating five vessels between July and November, significantly reducing transit times.
The collaboration between Russia and China has raised concerns over potential dual-use operations under the guise of commercial activities. On October 7, 2023, the Chinese vessel Newnew Polar Bear entered the Baltic Sea and dropped anchor in the Gulf of Finland, dragging it across the seabed and damaging the Balticonnector pipeline and the EE-S1 telecommunications cable linking Finland and Estonia. During this incident the vessel was joined by Russia's state-owned nuclear-powered cargo ship Sevmorput. Both ships proceeded to St. Petersburg according to AIS data. After departing St. Petersburg two days later, the Newnew Polar Bear lingered for 10 hours off the port limits near Kaliningrad before transiting to the entry point of the NSR, escorted by Sevmorput. This sequence of events suggests potential collusion between Russia and China in a deniable operation to disrupt critical sub-sea infrastructure in the Baltic. Under the 2023 Arctic MOU, FSB and Chinese Coast Guard personnel must be aboard vessels transiting the NSR, raising further questions about their involvement.
The pattern of sub-sea cable disruptions continued in November 2024. On November 17, Finnish cable operator Cinia reported damage to the Baltic submarine cable C-Lion1, which links Helsinki's Santahamina Island to Rostock, Germany home to NATO's newly established Command Task Force (CTF). Moscow had previously protested NATO’s bolstered presence in the Baltic region and the following day, Swedish authorities reported a similar breach to a telecommunications cable between Sweden and Lithuania. Both incidents coincided with the presence of the Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3, which had its AIS beacon deactivated in a violation of maritime regulations. Owned by the small Chinese company Ningbo Yipeng Shipping, the vessel had departed the Russian port of Ust-Luga enroute to Port Said, Egypt. The Danish Navy continue to shadow Yi Peng 3, while the investigation is under way. Notably, the ship had conducted a 10-day port call in Murmansk, home of Russia's Northern Fleet, in September 2024.
These incidents underscore the urgent need for enhanced situational awareness in maritime domains, particularly in sensitive areas like the Arctic and Baltic. Unmanned systems, especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) USVs, can play a pivotal role in monitoring maritime traffic and gathering evidence of sabotage. Complemented by UUVs for rapid underwater investigations, these systems could enable naval forces to act swiftly against vessels implicated in hostile actions. Enhanced maritime ISR capabilities are essential to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain stability in geopolitically sensitive regions.
US Model
The United States Navy serves as a model for successful integration of unmanned platforms. Units such as USVRON Three develop and operate advanced unmanned maritime systems, while USVDIV 1 and SURFDEVGRU 1 manage tactical development, training, and operations. The Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC) and Unmanned Maritime Systems Program Office (PMS 406) continue to advance and sustain unmanned maritime capabilities, with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday predicting that 40% of the fleet will be unmanned by 2035.
Middle East
In the Middle East, escalating tensions have turned the Gulf of Aden into a high-risk zone for merchant vessels due to Iranian-backed Houthi attacks. The use of the Iranian designed Toofan-1 USV laden with explosives for the first time has delivered considerable damage to shipping in the area. These assaults have rerouted significant shipping traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, causing delays and increased costs.
The Iranian Qader series and Chinese C-801 anti-ship missiles pose a growing threat, compounded by the erosion of air superiority as Iranian-trained Houthi forces have successfully downed several high-value American Reaper and MQ-9 drones using the Iranian SA-67 shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile with a loitering capability. This highlights the urgent need for a new approach focused on deploying unmanned counter-drone systems. Potential solutions include the use of fast, armed UAVs launched from Djibouti and Turkish USVs like the ULAQ 11 equipped with a 12.7mm machine gun which could neutralize hostile USVs along the Yemeni coast.
South China Sea
As global security concerns shift, the South China Sea looms as a potential flashpoint. China has heavily invested in unmanned maritime technology such as the Thunderer A2000. At 45 meters the trimaran boasts a top speed of 35 knots and is equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, an eight-cell VLS for surface-to-air missiles, and 24-cell launchers for loitering munitions.
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continue to integrate UAVs, USVs, and UUVs into its operations, notably around Taiwan, showing the importance China puts on these unmanned systems. The development of the "Great Underwater Wall" underscores China’s commitment to underwater monitoring and defence and its strategic interest in UUVs has been met with significant government funding and research initiatives to SME’s, driven by the PLA’s focus on disruptive technologies.
European Future Strategy
U.S. concerns about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are shaping naval policy, potentially dividing NATO, and a new U.S. administration less supportive of Ukraine could leave Europe to support Zelensky alone. The logic of prioritizing distant conflicts over European security is questioned, particularly as Europe faces internal political and diplomatic challenges such as the lost majority for Macron, and Germany in political paralysis does not bode well at such a critical time for European security.
Resource constraints mean that European navies lack the capacity to address simultaneous threats from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea all of which are now aligned with the Russian war effort. Unmanned systems in the short term will help to bridge capability gaps if taken seriously as force multiplier and deployed accordingly. The ability to build and deploy unmanned naval systems to key areas of likely conflict will increase situational awareness and prepare the ground before larger naval assets reach the operational theatre.
Naval doctrine must evolve rapidly to integrate emerging technologies, with AI and autonomous systems poised to revolutionize the way maritime warfare is conducted. Historically, naval strategy has centred around carrier battle groups and manned warships. However, the future will demand a shift from these traditional, carrier-centric approaches toward more agile and innovative strategies that can leverage unmanned and autonomous platforms effectively.
One critical area where these technologies will have significant impact is in "Grey Zone" operations – activities that fall between conventional warfare and peacetime diplomacy. Unmanned systems are particularly suited for such operations, where deniability, persistence, and reduced risk to human personnel are vital. These platforms can conduct covert surveillance, disrupt or neutralise adversary drones, and contribute to broader strategic initiatives without escalating to full-scale conflict.
Ethics
The rise of autonomous systems does, however, introduce complex ethical concerns, especially regarding the delegation of life-and-death decisions to machines. To address these concerns, it will be essential to ensure that human oversight remains a fundamental component of these technologies. Programming AI to adhere to stringent ethical guidelines will ensure that even in high-stakes situations, human judgment plays a decisive role. Balancing effectiveness with accountability will help mitigate public concerns and maintain operational legitimacy.
Drone-on-drone warfare is expected to become more prevalent as AI continues to advance. The moral dilemma surrounding such conflicts is relatively diminished because the destruction involves machines rather than human lives, leading to reduced political consequences and a public that may remain largely indifferent. This lower-stakes environment could accelerate the development and deployment of AI-driven countermeasures and offensive strategies, emphasising efficiency and precision.
Piracy
The growing dependence on autonomous systems brings forth the risk of "Tech Piracy." As the world's oceans become increasingly populated with drones – many engineered for long-endurance, low-speed missions – these platforms become susceptible to interception. Shadowy entities like the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) may seek to capture and analyse such assets, and the possibility of adversaries reprogramming these drones or infiltrating their command-and-control networks poses an emerging challenge to naval security.
This risk was exemplified in 2018 when Houthi forces captured a US Navy REMUS 600 UUV, which was subsequently studied by Iranian engineers. This led to the development of a new One-Way Attack (OWA) UUV, deployed against a US warship off the coast of Yemen in February 2024, though it was successfully neutralised. This incident starkly illustrates the danger of our own advanced technologies being turned against us.
Conclusion
These challenges highlight the urgency of rethinking naval strategy and building resilient systems that can operate in contested and complex environments. The interplay between emerging threats, technological advancements, and ethical considerations will shape the future of maritime warfare, requiring a proactive and multifaceted response from military and civilian stakeholders alike.
