The global Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (CUAS) ecosystems – particularly those involving small Group I-II drones – underwent rapid, transformative growth, largely driven by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Previously dismissed as recreational “toys” before 2022, drones under 25 kilograms evolved into the critical weapons of modern warfare. The war in Ukraine dramatically accelerated the use and development of these drones, which served as indispensable tools for battlefield intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision targeting, and kamikaze strikes.
In 2024 alone, Ukrainian manufacturers reportedly produced approximately 1.2 million drones, over 90% of which were First Person View (FPV) kamikaze models, often modified from commercial racing drones that rose to popularity in the early 2010s. Many of these drones were given symbolic Ukrainian names to reflect their tactical purpose. "Baba Yaga," named after the mythical Slavic witch, designated stealthy kamikaze drones. "Perun," after the Slavic god of thunder, represented precision-strike platforms. "Kozak," referencing the independent Ukrainian Cossacks, signified agile reconnaissance units. "Viy," drawn from folklore as a creature with a deadly gaze, applied to drones with advanced optics. "Mavka," named after a forest spirit known for secrecy, suited covert ISR drones.
The rapid evolution of UAS and CUAS systems – driven largely by the realities of the Russia-Ukraine war – has outpaced the development of standardized training, testing, and operational procedures across NATO and allied nations. While Ukraine has demonstrated how small drones can be integrated effectively into modern combat through improvisation and high operational tempo, Western countries have yet to translate these lessons into formalized doctrine. The absence of validated performance benchmarks, independent testing regimes, and consistent operator training leaves a critical gap between system capabilities as advertised and actual performance under battlefield conditions.
Addressing this gap requires a deliberate and coordinated effort to professionalize the UAS/CUAS ecosystem.
This includes establishing common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), creating independent proving grounds to test systems in adverse and realistic conditions, and developing training programs that prepare operators for contested electromagnetic environments and rapidly changing threats. Without these reforms, Western forces risk continued underperformance, misallocation of resources, and loss of credibility on the battlefield.
In 2024, Ukraine created the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Ministry of Defence, becoming the world’s first military branch solely focused on unmanned aerial, ground, and maritime systems. Despite this organizational leap, UAS training within Ukraine remained inconsistent, heavily reliant on a mix of commercial and non-profit training providers. Notable examples included Drone Fight Club, Global Drone Academy, and Dronarnia, each offering curricula shaped by firsthand frontline experience but lacking uniform standards.
The United States also has no formal Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for dedicated small drone units or structured UAS/CUAS training. Instead, this capability remains the domain of commercial providers. Companies such as Oak Grove Technologies in North Carolina offered tactical UAS/CUAS training and scenario-based exercises at their purpose-built facilities. FLYMOTION, delivered drone training, tech integration, and mission-specific support for military and public safety agencies.
Meanwhile, adversaries like China and Russia rapidly adapted their drone capabilities by studying lessons from Ukraine, reinforcing the urgent need for standardized, formal training across NATO and allied forces.
CUAS systems detect, classify, track, identify, and neutralize rogue or hostile drones. These systems typically integrated radar, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras, acoustic sensors, and radio frequency (RF) detectors. For example, detecting a Class 1 FPV drone with a radar cross-section that allowed visibility at 3.7 km – traveling at 100 km/h – left only a two-minute window to assess the threat and deploy countermeasures. Within that narrow timeframe, human operators were required to act decisively, classifying the drone, interpreting intent, and deploying electronic or kinetic countermeasures, such as RF jamming, spoofing, directed energy, or physical interceptors.
Hesitation or indecision in high-pressure situations, such as distinguishing a drone from a civilian Airbus A320, significantly reduces response time and underscores the need for comprehensive training, clear rules of engagement, and precise threat identification.
Ukraine’s CUAS tactics rapidly evolved in response to the constant drone warfare including Iranian Shaheds. Handheld RF "drone guns" aimed to jam control signals or GPS navigation, but their effectiveness often waned quickly, as drone operators shifted frequencies or adopted frequency-hopping techniques. As a result, these tools frequently became obsolete shortly after deployment. Ukrainian units and their adversaries tested other CUAS methods, including firearms, laser-based systems, and missile interceptors, though many of these demonstrated mixed results at best and unreliable field performance.
Larger-scale electronic warfare (EW) systems also played a key role. At the strategic level, legacy air defense systems like the Patriot Missile Defense PAC-3 were used to intercept high-value Russian-launched threats, including Shahed 136 drones and cruise missiles like the KH-31. While effective, the cost imbalance – $4 million for a PAC-3 missile versus a $135,000 Shahed – was financially unsustainable in the long term. CUAS solutions needed to evolve toward greater scalability, cost-efficiency, and operational flexibility.
Despite the volume of drone deployments, the number of trained operators, and the thousands of sorties conducted each month, western militaries have made minimal progress in codifying TTPs, or setting technical specifications and performance benchmarks. This lack of standardization led to fragmented practices, poor interoperability, and training inconsistencies. Worse still, it created space for marketing hype, disinformation, and outright fraud by major U.S. and European vendors.
Don’t Treat UAS/CUAS System Testing Like a Magic Trick
UAS and CUAS system testing often looks like a magic trick – impressive from the front row, but built on sleight of hand. Under tightly controlled conditions, they dazzle. The weather is perfect, the terrain is clear, and every variable is carefully choreographed to ensure success. But step off that stage and into the chaos of the real world, and the illusion starts to fall apart.
These systems depend on narrow windows of optimal performance – predictable attack vectors, bigger drones, uncontested electromagnetic environments, cooperative weather. Outside of those pristine scenarios, the "magic" fades fast. Sensors glitch in heavy rain or snow, terminal guidance fails, pixel lock doesn’t lock. Flight controls falter in high winds. Batteries buckle under extreme cold. Sophisticated electronic warfare overwhelms command links, and fries GPS. What looks seamless in a demo often stumbles on the zero line in Ukraine.
The Gap Between Testbed Performance and Battlefield Reality
The gap between testbed performance and battlefield reality is more than inconvenient – it’s dangerous. When military planners believe the trick, when they buy into the illusion, they make deployment decisions that fail under pressure. Systems aren’t ready. Operators aren’t trained. Adversaries exploit the seams. False confidence replaces hard truth – and in combat, soldiers die.
The Solved Problem Conundrum and the Military-Industrial Complex
The widespread belief that the drone problem is already “solved” discourages innovation. Entrepreneurs, assuming the market is saturated with capable systems, hesitate to invest in new solutions. This stagnation hampers adaptability and allows outdated technologies to persist.
Manufacturers, operating without oversight or verification standards, exaggerate product performance. This erodes trust, misallocates budgets, and stunts technological progress. As U.S. General David Perkins observes, “Drones aren’t inherently transformational; it’s the disciplined, rigorous operational concepts we build around them that define their effectiveness.”
Solving this requires professionalizing the ecosystem. Western armed forces, border agencies, and defense firms must unify around validated TTPs – based on battlefield experience and actionable intelligence. Ukrainian Major Dmytro Beskrestnov of the Electronic Warfare Service warns, “Without proper drone and electronic warfare support, an infantry unit will survive only a few hours on the battlefield.”
His warning demands a curriculum focused on contested electromagnetic spectrum operations, adverse weather flight planning, low-signature reconnaissance, and EW countermeasures. Live-fire training, structured after-action reviews, and recurring recertification are essential. Independent proving grounds are critical. Systems must be validated under uncontrolled, extreme environments – not pristine trade show conditions.
Learn from the Past or Lose the Future
This lesson isn’t new. Nearly a century ago, General Billy Mitchell – often called the father of the U.S. Air Force – faced similar institutional resistance when he proved that aircraft could sink battleships. In 1921, he shattered the belief in naval invincibility. Rather than being embraced, he was court-martialed for speaking hard truths.
Mitchell’s legacy underscored a hard truth: militaries that ignore disruptive technologies – or fail to test them under realistic conditions – pay the price. His call for rigorous, unscripted validation of emerging capabilities echoes louder than ever.
Today’s drone war isn’t fought with brochures or staged demos – it’s fought in trenches, under jamming, in freezing rain, with lives on the line.
“If your drone can’t survive two days at the front, it’s not a weapon – it’s a toy.”
Unnamed Ukrainian UAS Unit Commander
The Way Forward Requires Leaders Who Give a Damn
Fixing this ecosystem isn’t about tweaking procurement pipelines, chasing lobbying dollars, or launching BS ad campaigns for VC investors. It’s about leadership. We need leaders who give a damn – not about quarterly profits or performance theater – but about the soldier on the front line, the operator under pressure, the mission that can’t afford to fail.
General James “Mike” Holmes says it best: “The future of drones is limited not by technology, but by our imagination, commitment, and courage to write new rules.”
That future rests on the shoulders of those willing to push past politics, marketing hype, and institutional inertia – and insist on truth, rigor, and real capability.
Professionalizing the UAS and CUAS domain starts by burning down the illusion and building something real. Not just drones that fly – but TTPs that evolve with battlefield lessons. Not just systems that pass a demo – but operators who survive a war.
“The only way to stop the next war is to be ready for the last one.”
General Billy Mitchell
That work starts now. And it starts with leadership that refuses to look away.
