The use of Land Precision Strike (LPS) capabilities had, until recently, been viewed as the preserve of advanced militaries with the technical and financial capacity to purchase, and the sophistication to coordinate their use across domains (land, air and potentially sea as well) to achieve operational objectives. However, the proliferation of commercial technology on the battlefield is shifting this paradigm, democratising access to capabilities that can deliver precision strike to all land forces.
This insights article explores how Loitering Munitions and One Way Attack capabilities are delivering precision strike ‘on the cheap’ by blending the features of precision-guided missiles and drones. It assesses how this has impacted the close and deep battle in current conflict and suggests potential capability decisions for Western Militaries.
Traditional Use of LPS in Close and Deep Battle
Traditional Land Precision Strike (LPS) capabilities such as precision-guided rocket artillery and tactical ballistic missiles are resource intensive. They require extensive coordination, specialised training and significant technical and financial investment. This was deemed acceptable as they are corps and divisional assets for use primarily in the deep battle.
Exquisite LPS capabilities are relatively scarce on the battlefield but can defeat targets beyond the reach of other land-based assets. As such, with command of LPS capabilities held at the highest level and control being delegated as appropriate to fire missions, they are prioritised for high-value or high-payoff targets in the deep. The intent is to create operational level dilemmas, deny the enemy freedom of action or draw their resource away from the close battle. In terms of supporting the close battle, doctrine1 suggests that LPS would be used to inflict substantial losses on an adversary’s fighting power before the close battle begins or to target reinforcements or combat assets about to join the battle rather than in direct support.
The associated targeting process coordinates effects centrally to select and prioritise targets and weapon-match them with available assets. The benefit of such an approach is that when there is insufficient capability to strike all targets (highly likely to be the case) effects are prioritised against defeating targets most likely to contribute to the success of the mission. One drawback of this centralised model is the protracted timescale required, placing limitations on how effective it can be in exploiting dynamic battlefield conditions.
Whilst LPS could be used to enable the close battle as part of a concentration of effect to fix and strike enemy targets ahead of offensive action, their scarcity means delegation down from divisional level to brigades is by exception. For most forces engaged in the close battle, their ability to deliver precision strike is limited to what they, or their forward observers, can see and what organic assets they have available.
The Evolution of LPS
The concept of using armed Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) for ‘kamikaze’ strike on the battlefield is not new and can be traced back to World War I with the experimental Kettering Bug. Whilst concern over reliability and cost didn’t see the bug used in combat, the use of drones by the military, primarily for reconnaissance, has expanded over subsequent conflicts with ever increasing sophistication, capability and cost.
Loitering Munitions (LM) are autonomous armed UAVs which blend the features of drones and precision-guided weapons. LMs stay airborne or ‘loiter’ for some time, identify a target and then attack.2 Whilst some militaries have been experimenting with LMs as a means of targeting Air Defence systems since the 1980’s, they were not widely adopted. Atherton noted that in 2022 only 7 countries, all with advanced drone programmes, had domestic LM projects while a handful of other countries had bought from these programmes.3
Azerbaijan was one country that had procured the capability and noted that it could mitigate their lack of exquisite LPS systems or stealth aircraft. By integrating LMs cleverly within their wider strategy, they enjoyed notable success in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 by using them to defeat anti-air defences and allow the exposed heavy equipment of the Armenian forces to be targeted with relative impunity. LMs were no longer just a niche capability used by special forces for limited aims, they provided a technological advantage that achieved a major strategic benefit in battle.
Militaries and other actors took note and adaptation of existing drones started en-masse for those not requiring a full Mil-Spec solution. Tactical forces, less advanced militaries and even non-state actors could see an opportunity to target their adversaries with unprecedented precision and lethality through disposable, lower-cost capabilities. LMs now exist as an alternative to everything from air strikes to grenade tosses4. Capable of a broad range of missions including the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, rebroadcast and strike5, they can provide both hunter-killer or strike only capability.
While NATO may still be attempting to standardise terminology and agree a definition6 and some nations – including the UK – are wrestling with how to regulate, many more agile militaries are acting, absorbing the lessons from recent conflicts, and implementing changes to their doctrine, forces structures and capability procurements.
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The Democratisation of Precision Strike
The proliferation and adaptation of commercial drone technology into recent conflicts has accelerated the deployment of LM and One Way Attack (OWA) capabilities exponentially. OWA are single use, ‘fire and forget’ self-propelled munitions that replicate missiles without being constrained to their trajectory, complexity or cost. Like LMs, OWA are based upon a drone platform but do not have a pilot, communications link or ability to be reprioritised once launched. OWA need a pre-planned stationary target, whereas LM can be reactive (with or without a human in the loop).
Deep Battle
Both Russia and Ukraine have used long range OWA capabilities extensively for the deep battle with some systems capable of striking over 1,000km7. Russian Shaheed drones have routinely targeted Ukrainian infrastructure and its energy network while evidence of Ukrainian attacks deep into Russia to target military facilities and oil refineries is widely available on Telegram and X despite suppression within Russian news.
The need for scale and deception on a contested battlefield crammed with defensive systems is necessitating both Russia and Ukraine to deploy lower-cost OWA capabilities in tandem with their exquisite LPS capabilities to enhance effectiveness in the deep battle. Deploying a screen of OWA may significantly enhance the chances of a tactical ballistic missile getting to the high-value or high-payoff target and has the added benefit of requiring your adversary to unmask expensive air-defence assets to target the OWA screen.
Christopher Kirchhoff argues that one of the most significant lessons to emerge from the conflict in Ukraine is the difference commercial technology is making by its ability to attrit superior enemy weapon systems … and multiply the combat effectiveness of stock armaments.8
OWA drones are having a transformative effect on the deep battle. They allow forces to strike enemy command structures, logistics hubs, communication nodes and supply chains located deep in the rear echelons en-masse. As well as the physical disruption, forcing opponents to divert resources toward defence, the psychological impact of these attacks can quickly degrade enemy morale, compelling adversaries into a reactive posture that hinders their overall operational effectiveness.
While OWA emulate missiles, their relative simplicity and low-cost means they do not provide the same capability as exquisite LPS. They require integration into a similar architecture for targeting and battle management that leverages multi-domain information, however, their limitations (reduced ability to fly through congested areas, how they navigate and the speed they fly) make them susceptible to countermeasures, meaning even more sophisticated route planning is required to identify targets they can strike. In addition, their failure rate due to less robust or non-militarised components and the reduced target effect due to lack of payload size, penetration power, and accuracy reduces their overall combat effectiveness. In short, OWA are not military-grade precision-guided missiles, but they do offer a very cost-effective means of delivering explosives to targets in the deep battlespace for those who do not possess exquisite LPS, and are a means of providing mass attack and enhancing existing capabilities for those that do.
Close Battle
Much has been written about the use of First Person View (FPV) UAS within the Ukraine conflict, costing from a few hundred to a few thousand US dollars; they have been dubbed the ultimate asymmetric weapon9. When armed with an explosive payload and used in the strike role, FPV’s are effectively a commercial version of a short-range military loitering munition, albeit one that requires real-time pilot control to fly effectively. The recent insight from Ivan Kaunov highlighted that the cost-to-strike ratio of FPVs when compared to conventional artillery can be as high as 500:110 .
Commercial FPV UAS, as used in drone racing, require constant pilot input and their low-grade sensors mean that acquiring and hitting targets when used as a LM is a significant challenge placing an immense burden upon operators to use them effectively. It was therefore understandable that the strike success rate in the early stages of the Ukrainian conflict was in low single figures.
Innovation on the battlefield in the form of assisted targeting (pixel lock) and clever tactics, techniques and procedures, have seen this success rate rocket to above 40%11. FPV LMs now own the short-range close battle in Ukraine, roaming the entire tactical space12.
However, FPV LMs are not a panacea. They require extensive operator training to achieve accuracy, are particularly vulnerable to jamming and fail regularly. They are easily detectable due to a high acoustic signature (whine) although this has been seen to generate a negative psychological effect. The use of improvised munitions also presents a significant safety risk for operators at launch and, when combined with poor reliability, recreates the original concern that prevented use of the Kettering Bug with the danger of an armed drone failing above friendly troops. Necessity means that FPVs are the only cost-effective solution available at scale for use in the very close battle in Ukraine, but without significantly improved safety, serious consideration must be given to the risk they present for militaries not at war. Mil-Spec armed quadcopters are rapidly emerging to mitigate these risks with increased portability and reduced operator burden, however, these come with a Mil-Spec price point.
The options for true LMs have grown from the 7 domestic programmes Atherton highlighted in 2022, into many hundreds of alternative options. While endurance and cruise speed determine the maximum possible range, the communications link is often the limiting factor (assuming a user must remain in the loop). Communications options resistant to jamming and the use of aerial rebroadcast to deliver over the horizon strike is a topic worthy of its own article. Another critical area worthy of more focus is software and integration into C2 and battlespace management systems – the most capable systems are running advanced targeting algorithms on edge processing systems to ensure that LM strike the target even when subject to intense localised electronic warfare. However, these systems must be able to maintain communications long enough for user authorisation where rules do not permit fully autonomous strike. Ukraine has shown the benefit of modular, open architecture systems that provide the user options to modify and integrate over closed loop systems once they have been effectively countered. Hardware options fall into three broad categories each with different generic strengths/weaknesses:
Fixed Wing LMs; efficient design which maximises endurance and can achieve a low acoustic signature but generally have a lower thrust/weight ratio resulting in smaller payloads (or large systems) and require a dedicated means of launch to get them airborne potentially exposing the users. Aerodynamically, they must remain above the stall speed resulting in a ‘lingering’ mode rather than being able to hover. Generally, they strike at an acute angle – which is effective against exposed targets, but this trajectory limits the ability to deliver top attack or effective strike in congested areas (urban/wooded etc).
Multirotor LMs; can be tube or soft launched, including from cover, allowing increased user protection. Their design can achieve excellent maximum velocity (especially for tail driven dart designs). A medium thrust/weight ratio facilitates an acceptable payload/size balance but when assembled they are generally less soldier portable (or require assembly prior to launch). This design creates a high acoustic signature due to small propellers moving very fast, and it can hover and deliver effective top attack when combined with AI.
Co-axial LMs; this design facilitates soft launch, including from a tube, enabling the user to remain in cover. It has the highest thrust/weight ratio delivering a larger payload and it is the most soldier portable solution due to its narrow design and smaller mass. The larger propellers provide the lowest acoustic signature, but it has a lower maximum velocity and is more complex than a multirotor platform. It can hover and deliver effective top attack (with or without AI).
Whilst these hardware options are much more operator friendly than FPVs and are capable of organic precision strike (finding and striking their own targets), the reality is that they rarely work in isolation due to the challenge of maintaining communications. The task of getting an asset to and then successfully striking a target over the horizon, in the most contested of environments, must not be underestimated. Despite the high-cost of such hardware solutions relative to FPVs, the success rate at the much-increased ranges in Ukraine is as low as 10%13.
Like OWA in the deep battle, a low success rate using LM in the close battle can still be considered a success if their use has forced an adversary to unmask and use expensive counter measures, thereby expending critical resources and revealing targets for follow on LM to strike. Reliable and safe systems are required to be purchased and used at scale to deliver military advantage in the close battle. Buying at scale will also create an enduring psychological impact from the continuous threat and make individual units more affordable. It has recently been reported that China has placed an order for one million systems from a manufacturer14. The need to defend against scale attack means that cheaper mechanisms for countering both LM and OWA, rather than using expensive air defence missiles, need to be developed as a military priority.
LMs now offer the tactical user the ability to deliver precision strike across all the close battlespace. For example, Russian Lancet-3M LMs pose a threat to Ukrainian elements up to 70km behind their own forward line, while the use of relays/carriers to aerially launch LMs can increase the range as far as required. The tactical user is no longer limited to delivering precision strike at the limit of their direct fire range. Instead, the modern tactical war fighter can deliver Recce-Strike at the very limit of their area of operations.
Potential Capability Implications for Western Militaries
Daily use and operationally driven adaptation in active theatres is seeing the sophistication and availability of LMs and OWA increase rapidly, while at the same time the cost and training burden is decreasing. Such capabilities are being used at every level; from in isolation at the tactical level to strike armoured vehicles beyond the range of traditional systems, through to delivering affordable mass attack to complement the most sophisticated deep battles forcing the enemy to react and expose itself to more exquisite systems. Whilst not a panacea, the capability implications cannot be ignored.
The following are generic capability recommendations for a military that already possesses exquisite LPS capabilities:
- Loitering munitions and one-way attack capabilities are democratising land precision strike by delivering affordable systems to our adversaries. Procure affordable counter LM and OWA systems at scale.
- OWA are a very cost-effective means of delivering explosives to targets in the deep battlespace, providing mass and enhancing exquisite LPS systems. Procure OWA systems for the deep battle (100km+) for use against static targets and as decoys/deception for exquisite capabilities.
- FPVs are a cheap solution for the very close battle but require extensive operator training and are unreliable. Procure modular LMs that can cover the entire close battle (0-100km) at scale to drive affordability.
- Procurers should not fixate on finding the perfect closed-loop LM hardware solution on the assumption that it will enter service and remain unchanged for its service life. A key lesson from recent conflict is the need for rapid innovation due to the short shelf-life of systems before they are countered. Focus on procuring.
- Open architecture solutions capable of being integrated into existing (or new) C2 and battlespace management architecture.
- Modular systems designed to allow rapid spiral upgrades throughout their life, including in theatre.
- Systems with interchangeable payload options enabling user selected safe warheads and sensors dependent upon the mission/target.
- Edge processing systems capable of autonomously navigating to and prosecuting the target (once approved by the user) regardless of jamming or movement of the target.
Conclusions
The proliferation of commercially available drones is revolutionising modern warfare, democratising access to precision strike capabilities that were once exclusively the preserve of the most advanced militaries with the biggest budgets. Precision strike capabilities are now accessible to all forces and even non-state actors, regardless of size or resources.
One Way Attack capabilities are highly effective means of delivering explosives to targets in the deep, providing mass and enhancing the combat effectiveness of existing armaments. Modular, open, spirally upgradeable systems need to be procured and integrated into existing processes for the deep battle while affordable counter measures need to be developed ASAP.
Loitering Munitions are empowering soldiers at the tactical level, enhancing operational flexibility, reducing risks to personnel and minimising collateral damage. Loitering Munitions provide cost-effective precision strike down to the tactical level for the close battle but cheap FPVs are not true LMs and carry safety risk and significant operator overhead. Modular, open, spirally upgradeable systems that can be used across the close battle should be procured at scale to drive affordability
References
1 For example AFM Warfighting Tactics Part 2 Corps and Div
2 Dr Oleksandra Molloy, Drones in Modern Warfare: Lessons Learnt from the War in Ukraine, Australian Army Research Centre, 2024, at: Drones in Modern Warfare | Australian Army Research Centre (AARC)
3 Kelsey Atherton, ‘Loitering munitions preview the autonomous future of warfare’, Brookings, 2022, at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/loitering-munitions-preview-the-autonomous-future-of-warfare/
4 Ibid.
5 Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter, 'Chinese strategists evaluate the use of kamikaze drones in the Russia-Ukraine war', The Diplomat, 2023, at: https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/chinese-strategists-evaluate-the-use-of-kamikaze-drones-in-the-russia-ukraine-war/
6 Proposed Definition: An Aerial Loitering Munition is a munition following an operator influenced flight path (which can include to remain over a certain position) and is capable of non/beyond line-of-sight target verification and precision attack, has the ability to abandon an attack, can be re-assigned and is destroyed by functioning of its payload.
7 H. I. Sutton, Guide to Ukraine’s Long Range Attack Drone, 2024, at: http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-OWA-UAVs.html.
8 Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff, Unit X How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Future of War (Scribner, New York, 2024)
9 Molloy, 2024.
10 How Autonomous Vehicles Are Enhancing Military Trench Strategies » Karve
11 Speaker from Central Research Institute of Armaments and Military Equipment of
Armed Forces of Ukraine, Loitering Munitions Conference, London 2024.
12 Dan Sabbagh, ‘It is Impossible to Outrun Them’, The Guardian, 2025 at; ‘It is impossible to outrun them’: how drones transformed war in Ukraine | Ukraine | The Guardian
13 Ibid.
14 Dylan Malyasov, China Places Massive Order for Kamikaze Drones, Defence Blog, 2024, at: China places massive order for kamikaze drones
